Who holds sovereign debt and why it matters

Summary

Focus

Sovereign borrowing can help buffer the economy from macroeconomic shocks. This indebtedness can also make a country vulnerable to financial distress. The sharp increase in government spending and debt issuance with the Covid-19 pandemic has brought more urgency to understanding how a government can borrow. Answering this question requires knowledge of who invests in sovereign debt and how these investors may influence sovereign borrowing costs.

Contribution

We construct an aggregate data set of sovereign debt holdings by foreign and domestic bank, non-bank private, and official investors for 95 countries over 20 years. We use this database to identify which types of investor increase their holdings of sovereign debt when the sovereign borrows more (and reduce their holdings when the sovereign borrows less). We then examine how the sovereign debt holdings of these investors respond to the yield on that debt. Lastly, we combine these results to show how the composition of investors affects the sovereign's borrowing costs.

Findings

Private non-bank investors, mainly investment funds, increase their holdings of sovereign debt by more than other investors as the sovereign's total debt expands. They fund nearly 70% of increases in sovereign debt. Further, non-bank investors are the most responsive to changes in sovereign yields. Accordingly, as a sovereign increases its debt, its costs increase faster if non-bank investors are not present.

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of investor composition on the sovereign debt market. We construct a data set of sovereign debt holdings by foreign and domestic bank, non-bank private, and official investors for 95 countries over 20 years. Private non-bank investors absorb disproportionately more sovereign debt supply than other investors. Moreover, non-bank investor demand is most responsive to the yield. Counterfactual analysis of emerging market sovereigns shows a 10% increase in debt leads to a 6.7% increase in costs, but an outsize 9% increase if non-bank investors are absent. We conclude that these sovereigns are vulnerable to losing non-bank investors.

JEL classification: F34, G11, G15, F41

Keywords: sovereign debt, banks and non-banks, advanced economies and emerging markets