Macroprudential frameworks, implementation and relationship with other policies

Papers in this volume were prepared for a meeting of senior officials from central banks held at the Bank for International Settlements.

Emerging market central banks have a long history of using macroprudential instruments. But while most central banks carry a heavy responsibility for financial stability, legal objectives are generally vague, do not define success or failure, and say nothing about competing objectives. This complicates both accountability and the communication of macroprudential decisions.

Participants drew several lessons from their experience with implementing macroprudential instruments. First, macroprudential authorities need to act early if they want to address systemic risk effectively. Second, building buffers or shifting the composition of credit is easier than managing the cycle. Third, macroprudential measures tend to be better at constraining booms than at dampening busts. Fourth, although macroprudential tools could, in principle, be targeted very precisely, circumvention by lenders and borrowers require more broad-based approaches. Fifth, macroprudential measures and monetary policy can reinforce each other when used in the same direction. Sixth, the jury is still out whether macroprudential instruments could be used effectively to address regional disparities within economies.

This volume collects the background papers of a meeting of Deputy Governors of central banks from emerging market economies to exchange their experience with designing macroprudential frameworks and implementing macroprudential instruments.

JEL classification: E51, E58, G21