



# Discussion of “Trade Fragmentation and Inflationary pressures”

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


# Fragmentation

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
- Protectionism in industrial countries
  - Left behind groups
- Real risks
  - Resilience
- Geo-political risks
  - Ukraine, Taiwan

# Number of trade restrictions imposed annually worldwide



Sources: *Global Trade Alert*; IMF staff calculations.


# Sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP



Note: Sample's composition changes over time. Sources: Peterson Institute for International Economics; Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macroeconomy Database; Penn World Table (10.0); World Bank; IMF staff calculations.

# Global FDI flows 2013-2023

■ Global FDI flows (USD billions) ■ Global FDI flows (share of GDP %)



Source: [OECD FDI in Figures April 2024](#)



# Important question

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- What does trade fragmentation do to inflation?
- Popular wisdom:
  - Makes imports costlier
  - Higher inflation
- Traditional monetary economics
  - Only implies relative price adjustments
  - No long run effect provided central bank committed
  - Need to guard against second round effects



# This paper

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- Could even be deflationary
  - Need to look at aggregate demand also
  - Fragmentation may lower or increase  $r^*$
- Assumptions
  - Takes as given central bank inflation commitment (Taylor rule).
- Examines 3 cases

# 1. Gradual import price increase



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- Fragmentation restricts supply, leading to gradually higher import prices.
- Terms of trade shock, lower incomes
- Unconstrained households
  - lower spending because permanent income lower.
  - Can smooth through capital markets
- Hand to mouth households
  - real wages lower
  - lower spending and increase labor supply





# Gradual Contd.

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- CPI – average of lower domestic and higher foreign, with more weight on former
  - Inflation falls
  - $r^*$  falls because demand decline stronger
  - Monetary policy needs to loosen




# Assessment

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- Very interesting results from a tour de force exercise in modeling
- Challenges received wisdom
- Received wisdom comes partly from experience of increasing globalization

# What else might happen?



Source: Ha, Kose, and Ohnsorge (2021).



# Central bank incentives

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- Not just central bank efforts/frameworks (Rogoff (2003))
  - Disinflation even in countries that did not adopt inflation targeting
- De-globalization changes competition and thus monopoly profits
  - Greater temptation for central bank to inflate to increase output (Rogoff (2003)).
  - Greater incentive for central bank to tolerate higher inflation so as to keep labor share constant (Afrouzi et al. (2024))
    - Focus on long run demand



# Persistent transitional effects

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- Can the relative price adjustment needed alter inflationary expectations and make inflation more persistent?
  - Adjustment to oil shocks in the 1970s.
  - Adjustment in EMs with lower credibility.



# Investment effects

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- Lower FDI can affect productivity not just in traded sector but also in non-traded sector.
- What does lower productivity in non-traded sector do?

# Changed world alters central bank



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- Fiscal pressures
  - Ageing, defense, green transition
  - Higher incentives from fiscal to inflate
    - Devalue stock of debt
    - Reduce real rate and stimulate economy
- Green transition
  - Forced investment pushes up higher real rates
- Away from zero lower bound (less contractionary)
  - Long term real rates back up to long term trend (Rogoff, Rossi, and Schmelzing (2022))
- Are higher nominal and real rates harder for a central bank to maintain?



# Conclusion

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- Thought-provoking, carefully done paper.
- Will rightly provoke a lot of discussion.